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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
DOUGLAS MCKAY, JR.*
H. SIMMONS TATE*
R. HOKE ROBINSON*
Introduction
This topic, unfortunately, embraces a great many subjects
and overlaps many of the other topics covered in this review.
Nearly every case involves some question of procedure and
these questions, in turn, are interlocked with questions of
pleadings, evidence, and the like.
The authors have attempted in this article to group together
the cases involving particular procedural questions under
specific headings. Some headings embrace only one topic, and
others include numerous sub-divisions.
Under Institution of Action we have included cases where
action is instituted by attachment of property, both of indi-
viduals and foreign corporations. Under Injuction we have re-
viewed a decision involving applicants failure to exhaust
certain administrative remedies. Under Courts is reviewed a
decision concerning the power of the State Court to require
the United States to file its tax claim in a state proceeding.
Under Demurrer we have included cases involving mis-
joinder of an insurer and a case on the question of whether
an affirmative defense may be raised by demurrer. Under
Setoff there is cited a case involving a setoff which was al-
legedly premature.
Under Venue are cited cases which discuss the general prop-
osition and also a case on the question of whether the right to
contest venue is waived by the filing of a general answer,
and a case on the venue of a suit against a foreign corpora-
tion.
Under the heading of Judgment on the Pleadings there is
discussed a case wherein an insurance company brought suit
against an insurance agency for its failure to cancel an in-
surance policy with the result that the insurance company was
involved in certain liability under the policy.
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Under Discovery is discussed a case concerning the right
of a former employee to examine certain officers of his for-
mer employer before trial in order to secure certain infor-
mation needed to prove certain allegations of his complaint.
Under Evidence are discussed two decisions, one relating to
opinion evidence in condemnation proceedings, and the other
relating to the question of violation of a statute giving rise
to punitive damages.
Under Trial-Discretion of Trial Judge axe discussed several
decisions involving various discretionary powers of the trial
judge during the course of the trial. The cases include de-
cisions on qualification of jurors, ruling on whether or not
a proper foundation has been laid for certain evidence,
whether or not an expert's opinion is needed, whether or not
a mistrial should have been granted because of conduct of
attorneys, a new trial granted on after-discovered evidence,
and finally on the right of the trial judge to deny a motion
for voluntary non-suit.
Under Right to Jury Trial in Equity Case we review a de-
cision wherein in a prior proceeding the Judge ruled the case
to be in equity with no appeal from this ruling and the parties
thereafter, at trial, sought leave to have certain issues framed
for the jury. Under Non-Suit there is reviewed a case wherein
the deficiency in plaintiff's evidence was supplied by defense
testimony.
Under New Trial are cited cases differentiating new trial
nisi from a new trial absolute, cases where a new trial was
granted on damages only, and where a new trial was granted
when continuance was improperly refused.
Under Re-Opening Default Judgment are reviewed two de-
cisions, one involving a divorce and the other involving an
automobile collision.
Under Timely Preservation of Rights there are numerous
cases cited under various sub-heads. The first relates to timely
objection in the court below on various matters, a case on
timely objection to a juror and a case on timely application
for appointment of a guardian ad litem.
Under Waiver and Estoppel several cases and subjects are
reviewed. The first sub-heading relates to waiver of insur-
ance policy requirements; the second to a rather unusual case
involving estoppel by judgment; next there is a case on equit-
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able estoppel and, finally, a case where estoppel was applied
because of the failure of the party to require a reply to its
affirmative defense.
Res Judicata-Law of the Case reviews a decision wherein
an insurance company had secured a declaratory judgment
against its insured that it owed him no obligation to appear
and defend in his behalf but had neglected to make the third
parties, injured in an automobile accident and who had sued
the insured, parties to the declaratory judgment proceeding.
Finally, under Appeals we have reviewed numerous de-
cisions involving various questions of appellate procedure.
Under one sub-heading are discussed cases involving review
of facts by the appellate court. There is another heading in-
volving the appealability of a motion to strike, another head-
ing involves additional sustaining grounds in an appeal, and
finally there is a heading involving the abandonment of ex-
ceptions.
I. INSTITUTION OF ACTION
A. By Attachment of Property
In Brewer v. Graydon,1 the plaintiff attached certain prop-
erty of the non-resident defendant in a suit against the de-
fendant for alienation of plaintiff's husband's affections and
for criminal conversation with plaintiff's husband. Defend-
ant appeared specially and moved to set aside the attachment.
The lower court granted the motion and the Supreme Court
affirmed on appeal. It was held that the provisions of the
Code permitting attachment, to-wit; CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH
CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-901, providing in part:
In any actions... (3) for the recovery of damages done
to either person or property... (5) against a defendant
who is not a resident of this state ....
did not contemplate the use of this remedy in actions for
criminal conversation or alienation of affections. The Su-
preme Court said:
Attachment is an extraordinary remedy and exists only
by reason of statute providing same, and the Courts have
held almost without exception that the provisions of such
statutes must be strictly construed ....
In 1932, the General Assembly, cognizant of the prior
1. 2330. C. 124, 103 S. E. 2d 767 (1958).
[Vol. 12
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decisions of this Court heretofore referred to, adopted
what is now Section 10-902..., permitting attachment in
liable and slander actions, thereby broadening the field
in which attachments lie. Had it intended like treatment
in actions for alienation of affections or criminal conver-
sation, it would have been a simple matter to so provide,
which it did not see fit to do.
The case of Southeastern Equipment Co. v. One 1954 Auto-
car Diesel Tractor,'2 involved an attachment against property
of a foreign corporation and a so-called "special" appearance.
A summons was issued and an attachment was instituted
thereon. Thereafter Baumer Foods, Inc., owner of the attached
property, appeared "specially" and moved for a substitution of
security, posted bond and secured the release of the attached
property. It then moved to dissolve the attachment on the
ground that the affidavit was defective, and at the same time
demanded a copy of the complaint, subject to its motion to
dissolve the attachment. A day later it served another notice
seeking to qualify the previous day's notice and demand as
being subject to the special appearance.
Later a copy of the complaint was served on Baumer and
it then moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
more than thirty days had elapsed since the issuance of the
summons but no personal service had been made and no pub-
lication commenced.
The Supreme Court held that the foreign corporation had
submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court by its motion
to dissolve and its demand for the complaint, since it did not
comply with the provisions of Code Section 10-648 in regard
to giving notice that it intended to rely on the jurisdictional
objection or reserving its rights thereunder. The Court also
called attention to Code Section 10-406.1 that "a voluntary
appearance of a defendant is equivalent to personal service of
the summons upon him."
In regard to the sufficiency of the affidavit of attachment
the Court found it unnecessary to reach this question, since
the motion to dissolve was made after substitution of security,
which was an implied acknowledgment of the validity of the
attachment, and thereby came too late.
2. 234 S. S. 213, 107 S. E. 2d 340 (1959).
1959]
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II. INJUNCTION
A. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
In DePass v. City of Spartanburg,3 a landowner sought to
enjoin the enforcement by the City of an ordinance respect-
ing sub-standard housing and the City demurred to the com-
plaint which was dismissed and the landowner appealed. The
complaint alleged that the plaintiff had attempted to rehabili-
tate some of her property in accordance with the ordinance
but that the City, on August 8, 1957, had ordered that she
rehabilitate eleven of her houses by September 8th following,
and notified her of her right to a hearing should she request
the same within ten days. The plaintiff alleged that she had
requested such a hearing but, apparently, brought this ac-
tion for injunction before the hearing was had. The City's
demurrer was apparently based on the grounds that the plain-
tiff had not exhausted her administrative remedies and was,
therefore, not entitled to injunctive relief. The Supreme Court
held:
A party aggrieved by the application of an ordinance
must invoke and exhaust the administrative remedies
provided thereby before he may resort to the Courts for
relief .... Courts are reluctant to interfere with the ad-
ministrative action prior to its completion and in this
sense not final.
III. COURTS
A. Power of State Court to Require United States to File
Its Tax Claim in State Proceeding
The case of Want v. Alfred M. Best Company,4 involved a
proceeding to settle the insolvent estate of the late Samuel
Want, wherein the federal government intervened, asserting a
priority as to certain transferee and fiduciary liabilities to it
of Want for income taxes due by the estate of his brother and
asserting further that it was prohibiting from filing certain
transferee gift tax and estate tax claims because those claims
were pending in the Tax Court of the United States. The
lower court issued an order barring any claims the U. S. might
have against the Samuel Want estate unless it should assert
the same in this cause by August 20, 1956.
3. 234 S. C. 198, 107 S. E. 2d 350 (1959).
4. 233 S. C. 460, 105 S. E. 2d 678 (1958).
[Vol. 19.
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The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the pendency
in the U. S. Tax Court of claims brought there by Want be-
fore he died, seeking redetermination of proposed estate and
gift tax deficiency assessments against the brother Jacob
Want's estate, did not prevent the assertion of those claims
in this action; that the action of his executrix in seeking to
have the government assert all its claims in thds state court
action amounted to a waiver of any right she might have had
to insist upon a Tax Court determination of the deficiency
assessments; and that the state court order did not violate the
government's sovereign immunity from suit. The Court said:
Assertion of the estate and gift tax claims in this ac-
tion would have furthered the effective and orderly exer-
cise by the state court of the jurisdiction exclusively
vested in it, and would have accorded with that spirit of
cooperation between the independent tribunals of the
states and of the United States essential to the harmon-
ious functioning of our dual judicial system.
IV. DEMURRER
A. Misjoinder of Insurer
The question of making the indemnity insurer a named
party defendant was before the Court in Watts v. Baker and
Canal Ins. Co.,5 where a taxicab passenger sued the owner
and the insurer for personal injuries, claiming a direct right
of action by reason of a policy filed with the City of Columbia
pursuant to City Ordinance Section 36-6. The insurer de-
murred for misjoinder and also moved to make the complaint
more definite and certain by requiring the plaintiff to state
whether the insurance policy was filed pursuant to any statute
or ordinance and if so, to set forth the terms thereof.
The lower court overruled the demurrer but granted the
motion to make more definite, and the plaintiff amended her
complaint by setting forth the ordinance in full. The insurer
again demurred in that it now appeared that it was being sued
on a liability policy issued to its co-defendant and that no
cause of action existed against it until recovery of judgment
against Baker. Again the trial court overruled the demurrer.
The Supreme Court reversed, sustaining the demurrer and
directing that all reference to insurance coverage in the com-
5. 233 S. C. 446, 105 S. E. 2d 605 (1958).
1959]
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plaint be eliminated. The Court reviewed the cases permitting
direct action against an insurer, and Sections 58-1481 and
10-702.0 It also examined the Columbia ordinance in question,
the pertinent portion of which was:
The bond or policy shall stipulate that any person who
may recover final judgment for damages, such judgment
remaining unpaid for thirty days, shall have the right
of action on such bond or policy in the event the owner
of the taxicab is insolvent and does not pay the same
within thirty days.
The Court concluded that under this language the plaintiff
had no cause of action against the insurer until recovery of
final judgment against the owner, his insolvency, and failure
to pay the judgment within thirty days.
This ease demonstrates the importance placed on the word-
ing of the ordinance or statute in determining whether an in-
surance company is subject to direct action in this type of
case.
B. Raising Affirmative Defense by Demurrer
In Drakeford v. Dixie Home Stores,7 the lower court sus-
tained a demurrer to a complaint seeking damages for slander,
on the ground that the complaint did not state a cause of ac-
tion for slander. In the order the court stated: "As a matter
of law the question of the manager was as to a matter of
concern to both plaintiff and himself and therefore privi-
leged." On appeal the plaintiff raised the question that the
trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer on the ground of
privilege.
The Supreme Court agreed that this was error, and that in
a slander action the issue of privilege is a matter of defense
and is not ordinarily available on demurrer, citing Rivers v.
Florence Printing Co.,§ and the landmark case of Bell v. Bank
of Abbeville.9 However, the Supreme Court proceeded to
affirm the lower court on the basis that the complaint was de-
murrable as not stating a cause of action for slander.
6. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1952).
7. 233 S. C. 519, 105 S. E. 2d 711 (1958).
8. 141 S. C. 364, 139 S. E. 781 (1927).
9. 208 S. C. 490, 38 S. E. 2d 641 (1946).
[Vol. 12
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V. SETOFF
A. Premature Assertion
In Brock v. Mason and Holden,10 the Court held that before
a state of facts can be made the basis of a counter-claim or
set-off, there must be an independent cause of action therefor.
In this case, a surety company sought to set-off against a
sub-contractor's suit amounts allegedly due from the contrac-
tor on another project. But because the other project was in-
complete and no claim against the surety had been made
thereon, the Court held that the cause of action had not ma-
tured before the commencement of the primary suit and could
not, therefore, be made the basis of a set-off.
VI. VENUE
A. In General
In Ernandez, as Administrator v. Miller," an action for
wrongful death was brought in Chester County. The defend-
ant moved for a change of venue to Sumter County, on the
ground that at the time of commencement of the action he was
a resident of that County. It was admitted that he originally
resided in Chester, but his affidavit and others submitted on
his behalf sought to show that he was in the Air Force sta-
tioned at Shaw Field and rented an apartment in Sumter
County.
The plaintiff presented affidavits seeking to establish that
the defendant was still a resident of Chester at the time the
suit was commenced, and the court below agreed with him.
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the issue of resi-
dence under the venue statute, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CARO-
LINA, 1952 § 10-303, ("residence" here meaning domicile, as
distinguished from temporary dwelling-place) is a factual
one, and that its determination by the trial court is conclusive
unless without evidentiary support.
The Court indicated in Kelly v. Dangel2 that the burden
of showing improper venue is on the defendant. Defendant
was sued in Sumter County. He moved for a change of venue
to Richland County on the grounds that two other persons
really owned the business which plaintiff alleged he was con-
10. 233 S. 0. 40, 103 S. E. 2d 423 (1958).
11. 232 S. 0. 634, 103 S. E. 2d 263 (1958).
12. 233 S. C. 301, 104 S. E. 2d 383 (1958).
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ducting and that one of them lived in Richland County. The
judge's refusal was affirmed because, the Court said, no show-
ing was made by defendant that he was sued in the wrong
county or that he was a resident of Richland County.
The case of H. F. Branham v. Boney Diesel Works Co., Inc.
et al'3 was an action in claim and delivery for possession of
a tractor, bought in Kershaw County. The defendant moved
for change of venue to Richland County on the ground that
the proper venue for an action of this type is in the County
where the property is situate, but offered no proof as to the
location of the tractor, so the lower court promptly and prop-
erly denied the motion.
However, in the order denying change of venue the court
below held that since one of the defendants was a resident of
Kershaw County the Court of Common Pleas of that County
had jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed the result
reached, pointing out that it was unnecessary and therefore
improper to pass on the question of jurisdiction, which had
not been raised in the motion, but that the order correctly
disposed of the only issue before the Court.
B. Rights Not Waived by Answer
In Lee v. Neal et al.,14 an action for personal injuries
brought in Darlington County, one defendant was a Florence
County resident, though served in Darlington County, and
the other defendant was a North Carolina resident who was
not served. An answer in the form of a general denial was
filed and some five months later a motion for change of venue
to Florence County and one to amend the answer by denying
residency in Darlington County, supported by affidavit of
counsel that he had just learned of the true residence of his
client, was filed. At the hearing below the moving party pro-
duced affidavits in support of his position and the plaintiff
produced nothing to the contrary. The trial court granted the
motion to amend but denied the venue change, in the exercise
of its discretion.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that by answering
generally the defendant did not waive his right to move for a
change of venue, and that the court below abused its discre-
tion in not granting the motion on the showing that the de-
1S. 233 S. C. 226, 104 S. E. 2d 290 (1958).
14. 233 S. C. 206, 104 S. E. 2d 291 (1958).
[Vol. 12
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fendant was a resident of Florence County. It quoted with
approval from Brown v. Palmetto Baking Co.15 to the effect
that issues are not joined, necessitating trial, until answer
or demurrer, and therefore a motion to change the place of
trial cannot logically be required in advance of answer or de-
murrer.
C. Suit Against Foreign Corporation
In Whitley, as Guardian v. Lineberger Brothers,' a resi-
dent of Georgia brought action in Union County for personal
injuries against a North Carolina corporation. The collision
out of which the suit arose took place in Pickens County. The
Court held that under Section 10-303 of the 1952 Code the
plaintiff had a right to elect the county in which to bring the
action, the defendant being a foreign corporation. It also up-
held a refusal below to change the venue from Union to
Pickens or Greenville counties, stating that there was no mani-
fest abuse of the trial court's discretion.
VII. JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
In United States Casualty Company v. Hiers,'7 an insur-
ance company brought suit against an insurance agency to re-
cover from the agency the amount of judgment against the
insurer plus costs and attorneys' fees which the insurer had
been required to pay in a prior action' 8 because of the agents'
failure to return a premium to an insured under a policy
which the insurer had instructed the agents to cancel. The in-
surer based its action against the agents on the negligence of
the agents. The defendants filed their answer thereto denying
negligence, alleging that the insurer's loss was occasioned by
its wrongful cancellation of the policy and not the defend-
ants' failure to return premium, and that the defendants were
not liable for the plaintiff's cost of appealing the earlier case
to the Supreme Court, "which defendants neither participated
in or authorized." The plaintiff had forwarded the policy to
its insured on September 14, 1953, with notice to the insured
and to the agents that the balance of the premium must be
paid by September 28th. The insured paid the premium to the
15. 220 S. G. 38, 66 S. E. 2d 417, 419 (1951).
16. 233 S. C. 182, 104 S, E. 2d 70 (1958).
17. 233 S. C. 333, 104 !S E. 2d 561 (1958).
18. Taylor v. United States Casualty Co., 229 S. C. 230, 92 S. E. 2d 647
(1956).
1959]
10
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [], Art. 13
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol12/iss1/13
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
agents in time but they neglected to forward it to the insur-
ance company which, on October 7, cancelled the policy for
non-payment of the premium. The agents then forwarded the
premium to the insurer asking that the policy be continued but
the insurer notified the agents and the insured that the can-
cellation would not be rescinded, and returned the remittance
to the agents who failed to refund it to the insured and had
not done so at the time of trial of the Taylor case, according
to the testimony of one of the defendants in this case, Mr.
Hiers, at the trial of that case.
The plaintiff moved for judgment on the pleadings and the
motion was allowed by the lower court. The Supreme Court
said:
The second and third defenses referred to the 'wrongful'
cancellation of the policy by respondent, but it was
wrongful (as related to Taylor) only because of appell-
ant's agents' negligent failure to remit the premium to
respondent which they had collected from Taylor; as
against all others the respondent was within its rights
in cancelling the policy for non-payment of the premium.
One cannot set up the result of his own wrong as a de-
fense to his liability for the natural and probable con-
sequence of the latter, which appellants would do by this
plea.
The foregoing anticipates the fate of (2) of the first de-
fense. Appellants wrongful failure to remit the premium
to respondent caused it to cancel the policy, with the re-
sulting liability to Taylor. Again, appellants would shield
themselves from liability for their wrong by hiding be-
hind a direct and proximate result of it, which they
should have foreseen. Such a position is patently illogical
and no authority has been cited or found for it.
With reference to defendants' contention that they were not
liable to the plaintiff for its cost in appealing the earlier case
to the Supreme Court because they had not authorized nor
participated in the appeal the Supreme Court adverted to the
evidence in the record of a letter from plaintiff's attorney to
the defendants advising of the tendency of motions to the trial
court in the Taylor case for judgment n.o.v., and for a new
trial and notified the defendants that the insurer would look
to them for payment of the judgment and reimbursement of
[Vol. 12
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expenses if judgment was entered against it, and appellants
were invited to have their counsel assist in the argument of
the motion. A further letter was written advising the de-
fendants of the adverse ruling on the motion and asking de-
fendants reaction as to what appellant should do with refer-
ence to perfecting the appeal, pointing out the costs of the
appeal and other expenses which would be claimed against
the defendant if the appeal should be lost. The defendants ig-
nored the letters. The Supreme Court said:
It was the duty of appellants to voice at that time
their opposition to appeal if they were opposed. Under
the circumstances, silence amounted to acquiescence.
There is no contention that the appeal was frivolous; the
wisdom of it cannot be judged by the result alone. Nor is
there contention of impropriety in the amount of the
costs, expenses and attorneys' fee. Like the others, this
defense is without merit.
It is well settled by general rule that the failure of an
agent of an insurer to comply with the instructions of
the latter, whereby loss to it results, is liable over to the
insurer .... (authorities cited).
'If an insurance company which is entitled under the
terms of a policy to cancel or reduce the risk directs its
agent to cancel or reduce same, it is his duty to do so with
reasonable promptness, and if he negligently or willfully
fails to carry out peremptory instructions to cancel or re-
duce he is liable to the insurer for the amount which it is
required to pay in settlement of the loss.'
The Supreme Court held that judgment on the pleadings
was a drastic procedure but would be granted in proper cases.
It cited Section 10-654,19 providing "sham and irrelevant an-
swers and defenses may be stricken out on motion.. .", and
Section 10-1505,20 providing in part "if a demurrer, answer
or reply be frivolous the party prejudiced thereby, upon a pre-
vious notice of five days, may apply to a Judge of the Court
either in or out of the Court for judgment thereon and judg-
ment may be given acordingly." The Supreme Court said
further:
It was alleged that respondent did not 'vouch' appellants
to defend Taylor's action. There was no duty upon re-
19. CoDE OF LAws or SouTH CARoLINA, 1952.
20. Ibid.
1959]
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spondents to formally vouch appellants in the Taylor
case. They had full knowledge of pendency of it, were
consulted in reference to the defense and Hiers testified
for respondent, who was the defendant in that case. He
frankly admitted the failure of appellants, as agents, and
they still held the premium money which they should have
refunded to Taylor under the instructions of respondent
upon its cancellation of Taylor's policy ...
We are convinced, as was the Trial Court, that the an-
swer presented no issue for trial. (Emphasis and Om-
missions Mine.)
VIII. DISCOVERY
In Barfield v. Dillon Motor Sales Inc., 21 the plaintiff sued
his employer for injuries allegedly caused by negligence, et
cetera, of the employer. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that
the employer was subject to the Workmens Compensation
Law because it had more than fifteen employees but had re-
jected that law and, therefore, could not be permitted to de-
fend the action on the ground that the plaintiff was negligent,
that he assumed the risk, or that his injuries were caused by
the negligence of a fellow servant. The defendant denied that
it had fifteen employees so as to be subject to the Workmens
Compensation Law and deprived of its common law defenses.
Before defendant served its answer plaintiff moved for an
Order requiring defendant to produce its records showing the
names of its employees and certain other records relating
thereto for a period prior to respondent's injuries which mo-
tion was over-ruled by the Judge on the grounds that it was
premature. After defendant had served its answer the plain-
tiff renewed his motion to require the defendants to pro-
duce its records which was likewise denied by the Circuit
Judge on the grounds "the pleadings fail to show sufficient
grounds for the granting of plaintiff's motion and it must be
denied for failure to make the requisite showing by affidavit
in conformity with the applicable rules." Later, the respondent
moved for an Order before another Judge to allow him to ex-
amine before trial an officer of the defendant and also its
bookkeeper with respect to their knowledge with relation to
records of the defendant which would disclose information as
21. 233 S. C. 26, 103 S. E. 2d 416 (1958).
[Vol. 12
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to the nature of the employment or contract of hire of all em-
ployees of the appellant in February, 1956, and for six months
prior thereto. The motion was made pursuant to the pro-
visions of CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 26-503,
and was based upon the complaint and answer in the case,
upon an affidavit of respondent and certificate of respond-
ent's attorney. In his affidavit in support of the motion the
plaintiff named seventeen persons whom he identified as em-
ployees of the defendant but averred that in order for him to
safely go to trial it was necessary that he know prior to trial
the contract of hire of the persons named and that such in-
formation was exclusively within the knowledge of the per-
sons whose depositions he sought to take. The trial judge
granted the motion and referred the matter to the Master in
Equity for Dillon County to take the depositions of the wit-
nesses named. The defendants appealed from that order. The
Supreme Court affirmed the trial judge. In answer to the de-
fendants' contention that since the plaintiff had named seven-
teen persons in his affidavit allegedly employed by the defend-
ant the matter was already within his knowledge and pre-
cluded plaintiff's examining defendants before trial, the Su-
preme Court said:
We do not agree with this contention. It is imperative
that the respondent know whether any of the seventeen
persons named in his affidavit would be excluded from
the term 'employee' as such is used in Section 72-11, 1952
Code of Laws of South Carolina, which excludes per-
sons whose employment is both casual and not in the
course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of
the employer. There is also excluded persons who are in-
dependent contractors.
The defendant objected to the Order permitting discovery
on the further ground that the plaintiff was seeking to dis-
cover matters upon which the defendant made its defense. The
Supreme Court disposed of this contention by saying that the
plaintiff had alleged in his complaint that the defendant em-
ployed more than fifteen persons and the answer denied the
allegation and thereby affirmatively alleged that the appellant
did not have in its employ a sufficient number of persons to
require it to be subject to the provisions of the Workmens
Compensation Law. The Supreme Court citing numerous
authorities held:
1959]
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The pre-trial examination sought by the respondent is
not for the purpose of discovering evidence in support
of the allegations of appellants' answer. It is for the sole
purpose of establishing whether or not the appellant was
subject to and bound by the terms of the Workmens Com-
pensation Act on the date of respondent's injury. What
the respondent seeks by the pre-trial examination is ma-
terial to his cause of action.
The defendant further contended that the trial judge was
precluded from granting an Order to examine the two named
employees of the defendant before trial by virtue of the earlier
Orders by Judge Lewis denying the plaintiff the right to in-
spect certain records of the defendant. The Supreme Court
in over-ruling this contention said:
Reference to the two Motions, from which we have
quoted, shows that the Motions before Judge Lewis were
made pursuant to Section 26-502 of the 1952 Code of
South Carolina, and Rule 43 of the Circuit Court, and
was made for the purpose of seeking an inspection of cer-
tain books, papers, and documents in the possession of the
appellant. The Motion before Judge Littlejohn was made
pursuant to Section 26-503 of the 1952 Code of South
Carolina, and was supported by an affidavit pursuant to
Rule 45. It thus appears that the relief sought before
Judge Littlejohn was entirely different and distinct from
the relief sought before Judge Lewis. We conclude that
the previous Order of Judge Lewis did not determine the
issue made before Judge Littlejohn.
The defendant next contended that the trial judge com-
mitted error in permitting a pre-trial examination of a named
officer and a named employee of the defendant, rather than
of the defendant itself through its officers and employees.
The Supreme Court over-ruled this objection also, citing an
earlier decision of the Court (United States Tire Company v.
Keystone Tire Sales Company),22 in which it was said, inter
alia:
'It seems to us, and we so hold, that, when it is proper
for a corporation to be examined . . . it is also proper
for the officers of the corporation to be so examined, for,
as indicated before, a corporation must speak and act
22. 153 S. 0. 56, 150 S. E. 347, 66 A. L. R. 1264 (1929).
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through its officers . . . of course, the examination of
these officers and agents is to be limited to the affairs of
the corporation involved in the litigation, to which the
corporation is a party.'
IX. EVIDENCE
A. Opinion Evidence in Condemnation Proceeding
In S. C. State Highway Dept. v. Hines,23 a condemnee land-
owner who was a civil engineer and a general contractor
attempted to testify that a strip of land adjoining his property
on the rear had been offered for sale to him for five thousand
dollars. The court below refused to permit the introduction of
this evidence and limited counsel's inquiry to the question of
what, in his client's opinion, the land at the rear of his prop-
erty was worth. He then stated he thought it was worth five
thousand dollars.
The Supreme Court affirmed both rulings, stating the gen-
eral rule, as to the first question, that the price at which ad-
jacent property has been offered for sale is inadmissible, es-
pecially where such offer has not been accepted. On the sec-
ond question the Court held that "no peculiar ability or spe-
cialized training is required to enable a witness to testify as
to his opinion of the value of property with which he is ac-
quainted."
B. Violation of Statute for Punitive Damages
In the case of Smith, Administratrix v. Lynch, Administra-
tor C.T.A., 24 an auto accident case in which the drivers of both
cars were killed, the evidence was uncontradicted that the de-
fendant's testatrix failed to stop before entering the inter-
section of a "through highway," in violation of Section 46-423
of the 1952 Code, and there was also evidence that she was
driving at a speed in violation of Sections 46-361 et seq. The
Court held that these statutory violations, if the proximate
cause of the collision, would justify punitive as well as actual
damages.
X. TRIAL
Discretion of Trial Judge
The trial judge has a wide discretion in many phases of the
conduct of the trial. This was emphasized by several cases of
23. 234 S. 0. 254, 107 S. E. 2d 643 (1959).
24. 232 S. C. 608, 103 S. E. 2d 54 (1958).
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the Supreme Court this term. In Elliott v. Black River Elec.
Coop.,20 defendant's attorney sought to ask each prospective
juror whether the case had been discussed in his presence.
The trial judge, having already asked each juror if he had
formed an opinion on the merits of the case, refused to per-
mit the question. The Supreme Court held that Section 38-202
of the 1952 Code vests the trial judge with exclusive power
to determine a juror's competence and that his decision would
not be reviewed unless "wholly without evidence to support
it."
Three cases dealt with the trial judge's discretion in the
control of presentation of evidence. In Elliott v. Black River
Elec. Coop., supra, the defense counsel warned a plaintiff's
witness he would present witness A to impeach the plaintiff's
witness' testimony. Witness A was alleged to have spoken
with and taken a conflicting statement from the plaintiff's
witness. Later, the defendant offered witness B. The judge
refused to permit his testimony, ruling that no proper foun-
dation had been laid. The trial judge, the Court said, has dis-
cretion to determine whether a proper foundation for im-
peachment has been laid and his decision will not be disturbed
except where discretion is abused. In Jenkins v. Long Motor
Lines,2 6 the Court held that the trial judge likewise has discre-
tion in deciding whether an expert's opinion is necessary to
aid the jury in deciding the facts. And in Hansson v. General
Insulation & Acoustics, 27 the Court said the judge's discretion
with respect to the scope of cross-examination is not subject
to review except in cases of "manifest abuse or injustice."
In Rogers v. Florence Printing Co.,28 the plaintiff's attor-
ney remarked in the jury argument that one of defendant's
possible witnesses was not present because he (plaintiff's
counsel) "had something on" him. Defendant's motion for
mistrial was denied and the jury was simply instructed to dis-
regard the remark. In affirming, the Court said that the
question of declaring a mistrial under the circumstances was
discretionary with the trial judge and his decision was not an
abuse of that discretion.
25. 233 S. C. 233, 104 S. E. 2d 357 (1958).
26. 233 S. 0. 87, 103 S. E. 2d 523 (1958).
27 234 S. 0. 177, 107 S. E. 2d 41 (1959).
28. 233 S. C. 567, 106 5. E. 2d 258 (1958).
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In Evatt v. Campbell,29 defendant moved for a new trial be-
cause of after-discovered evidence. The evidence was that
plaintiff had (unsuccessfully) tried to bribe a witness.
The Court held that refusal to grant a new trial was discre-
tionary and would not be upset absent an abuse of discre-
tion amounting to legal error. The Court also stated that, to
justify a new trial because of new evidence, the evidence must
be: (a) such as will probably change the result; (b) dis-
covered since the trial; (c) unable to have been discovered be-
fore the trial by exercise of due diligence; (d) material to the
issue; (e) not merely cumulative or impeaching. Here, the
evidence would simply have tended to impeach the plaintiff.
In one case, Fairy v. Gardner,30 the trial judge was held to
have abused his discretion. In an automobile accident case,
plaintiff moved for voluntary nonsuit because the defendant's
insurance company's liability under the policy was the sub-
ject of a suit in federal court. Plaintiff admitted that he would
probably file suit again, and the judge refused the non-suit.
The Supreme Court held that both in equity and at law the
voluntary non-suit was within the trial judge's discretion, but
that it should be granted in the absence of "material or legal
prejudice" to defendant. The discretion comes into play only
upon a showing of prejudice to defendant. No legal prejudice
may be deduced merely from the fact that plaintiff might file
suit again, hence the judge abused his discretion in not grant-
ing the voluntary non-suit.
XI. RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL IN EQUITY CASE
In Allen Brothers Milling Company v. Adams,3 1 the plain-
tiff sought to enjoin the defendant from damming back water
entering their property and defendant counterclaimed to re-
strain the plaintiff from maintaining a second pond at its
present level. The plaintiff demurred to the counterclaim and
the judge ruled that the case was one in equity and that de-
cision on the demurrer must be deferred until after the evi-
dence had been taken. Later, defendants gave notice to plain-
tiff's counsel of a motion for framing of issues under Code
Section 10-105782 and Rule 28 of the Circuit Court and along
29. 234 S. C. 1, 106 S. E. 2d 447 (1959).
30. 233 S. C. 297, 104 S. E. 2d 374 (1958).
31. 233 S. C. 416, 105 S. E. 2d 257 (1958).
32. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952.
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with the notice proposed thirteen issues of fact to be tried by
a jury. Within the time required by the Circuit Court Rule
the plaintiff's counsel proposed eight issues for submission to
the jury. The motion to frame issues was heard by the trial
judge and he denied the motion on the ground that submission
of the proposed issues to the jury would cause confusion and
"would result in no substantial aid to and enlightenment of
the conscience of the Court". Accordingly, in the exercise of
his discretion he declined to submit any issues to the jury
and referred the case to the Master in Richland County to
take and report the testimony together with his findings of
law and fact. The defendants appealed from this order of
reference. The Supreme Court said:
We find it unnecessary to determine whether any issues
of a legal nature are raised by the pleadings. The con-
duct of the parties require that this action be regarded
solely as in equity. There was no appeal from the Order
of Judge Griffith holding that the suit was in equity. The
Motion by defendants to frame issue was made under
Section 10-1057 of the Code and Rule 28 of the Circuit
Court which apply only to cases in equity. So far as the
record discloses, no contention was made in the Court be-
low that the case involved legal issues upon which de-
fendants were entitled to a jury trial as a matter of
rights.
Under the foregoing circumstances defendants cannot
now claim that this is a law case entitling them to a jury
trial as a matter of rights. ....
Regarding the instant case, as we must, as an action in
equity, the parties were not entitled to a trial by jury as
a matter of right. The framing of issues was addressed
to the sound discretion of the Trial Judge. He was fully
empowered to refuse to submit issues to the jury and
either refer the case or determine the questions involved
without a reference ....
XII. NONSUIT
A. Where Deficiency Supplied by Defense Testimony
The rule that where a deficiency of evidence at the nonsuit
stage is supplied on either direct or cross-examination of de-
fense witnesses the error in failing to grant the nonsuit is
[Vol. 12
19
McKay et al.: Practice and Procedure
Published by Scholar Commons,
SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
cured, was reiterated in Padgett v. Colonial Wholesale Dis-
tributing Company.33 There, on cross-examination, a witness
for the defendant, after the court had overruled the nonsuit
motion, admitted that the truck of defendant was traveling 55
miles per hour in a 45 miles per hour zone. The Supreme
Court held that this supplied any deficiency that may have ex-
isted at the close of the plaintiff's case and repeated the fa-
miliar rule that violation of an applicable statute is negligence
per se, and whether such breach contributed as a proximate
cause to the plaintiff's injury is ordinarily a question for the
jury.
XIII. NEW TRIAL
A. New Trial Nisi
The difference between a new trial nisi and a new trial ab-
solute was discussed in Elliott v. Black River Elec. Coop.84
If it is thought that a verdict is unduly liberal, but not so ex-
cessive as to raise the presumption of passion or other ille-
gality, defendant should move for a new trial nisi-a new
trial "unless" the plaintiff should remit part of his verdict.
But if the verdict is so excessive as to raise a presumption of
passion or prejudice, defendant should move for new trial
absolute. In the former case, the verdict is legal, but excessive.
In the latter case, it is illegal and therefore no part of it can
stand.
B. On Damages Only
An interesting procedural point was before the Supreme
Court in S. C. Electric & Gas Co., et al. v. Aetna Insurance
Co., et al.,35 where, after a jury verdict in favor of the plain-
tiffs the trial judge granted a new trial limited to the issue
of damages, having found the verdict excessive but declining
to reduce it by order for new trial nisi.
The Supreme Court reversed on this ground, stating that in
the absence of statute or rule authorizing this procedure it
was not proper to grant a new trial as to damages only. The
Court pointed out that such is the federal practice, by rule
59 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and that the
practice prevails in many other jurisdictions, but "in the
absence of authorizing statute or rule we do not feel war-
33. 232 S. C. 593, 103 S. E. 2d 265 (1958).
34. 233 S. C. 233, 104 S. E. 2d 357 (1958).
35. 233 S. C. 557, 106 S. E. 2d 276 (1958).
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ranted in making such an important innovation in our proce-
dure."
C. Where Continuance Improperly Refused
In Graham v. Greenville City Coach Lines,36 the plaintiff
sued his former employer for a wrongful discharge from his
job. When the case was reached for trial defendant moved
for a continuance on the ground that its general superintend-
ent who allegedly had wrongfully discharged the plaintiff was
ill and unable to attend court, this motion being supported
by a physician's affidavit. Upon the agreement of plaintiff's
counsel that defendant's counsel's statement of what the wit-
ness would testify to if present would be admitted in evidence
so far as competent, the motion for continuance was over-
ruled and the trial proceeded in the absence of the witness
under Circuit Court Rule 27. However, at the trial of the case
plaintiff testified to certain matters which had not been
pleaded in the complaint and which could only be rebutted by
the testimony of defendant's general superintendent who was
ill. Defendant contended that this testimony took it by sur-
prise and that the motion for continuance should have been
granted. The Supreme Court held:
It is elementary that the granting or refusal of a motion
for continuance is within the discretion of the Trial Court
.... However, there are exceptions to almost all rules; in-
deed, there is an adage that exceptions prove the rule.
We have concluded that this case ought to be an exception
to the rule against reversal, of orders on motion for con-
tinuance, rare though such is. We think that it was an
erroneous exercise of discretion to refuse appellant's mo-
tion under the unusual circumstances of this case, and it
will be reversed.
The Supreme Court held that since the matter brought out
by the plaintiff at the trial had not been pleaded and defend-
ant could not controvert because of the absence of the only
witness who could testify thereabout there was sufficient
ground for granting of a new trial. While this case apparently
involved the question of whether or not the trial judge abused
his discretion in refusing to grant defendant's motion for a
continuance made before trial, actually it appears to the
writer that it instead involved the point that the defendant
86. 233 S. C. 175, 104 S. E. 2d 72 (1958).
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was in fact taken by surprise at the testimony which devel-
oped from the plaintiff during the trial which defendant could
not in the exercise of due care have foreseen.
XIV. REOPENING DEFAULT JUDGMENT
In Grant v. Grant,37 our Supreme Court stated the principle
that default judgments in divorce cases are not favored and
will be set aside more readily than in other actions, because
of the public interest involved in this type of action. However,
it went on to affirm the court below in refusing to reopen the
judgment, where counsel for the defendant wife waited six
months after learning of the default decree before moving to
reopen and in the meantime the plaintiff husband had re-
married. The Court held that laches can be invoked to bar re-
lief under Section 10-1213 of the 1952 Code even if the motion
is made within one year as prescribed, where there is inex-
cusable and prejudicial delay in making it.
Strickland v. Rabon,38 involved an action for personal in-
juries arising out of an automobile collision. The appellant
failed to answer the complaint within twenty days after serv-
ice, the case was tried and judgment secured in favor of the
plaintiff on June 17, 1958. Thereafter, on June 19, 1958, the
defendant attempted to serve an answer to the complaint but
plaintiff's counsel refused to accept service of the answer on
the grounds that the defendants were in default. On July 9,
1958, the defendants served notice on plaintiff's attorney of a
notice of motion to vacate the judgment on the ground that
judgment had been obtained due to mistake, inadvertence,
surprise and excusable neglect, alleging that the defendants
had a meritorious defense to the action. The judge of the
lower court denied the motion. The defendants appealed to
the Supreme Court, contending that the trial judge erred and
abused his discretion in refusing to set aside the default judg-
ment and allow the defendants to answer. The record dis-
closes that summons was served on May 22, 1958, and on May
30th defendants' personal attorney requested an extension of
time from the plaintiff's attorney and the latter on June 2,
1958, refused to grant an extension of time. Judgment by de-
fault was taken on June 17, 1958. The Supreme Court denying
the motion to re-open, held:
37. 233 B. C. 433, 105 S. E. 2d 523 (1958).
38. 2341St . 218, 107 S. E. 2d 344 (1959).
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We have repeatedly held that a motion to vacate or
set aside a default judgment under the above section3 9
of the Code is addressed to the sound discretion of the
Judge who hears it, and his conclusion will not be dis-
turbed by this Court in the absence of a clear showing of
abuse of discretion ....
In the case of Simon v. Flowers,40 . .. we said: 'Dis-
cretionary power under this section is vested in the trial,
not the appellate, Court. In an appeal from such an order
of the Circuit Court it is not our function, nor is it with-
in our power, to substitute our judgment for that of the
Circuit Judge simply because we might have reached a
different conclusion had we been in his place ....
The Court considered the numerous affidavits filed in the
case and held that inasmuch as plaintiff's counsel had refused
to extend the time for answering to defendant and defendant
had not moved before the Court to secure additional time,
that the record revealed no excusable neglect that would jus-
tify the re-opening of the default judgment.
XV. TIMELY PRESERVATION OF RIGHTS
A. Timely Objection
One of the most firmly settled rules of appellate practice is
that a question which has not been presented to the lower
court for consideration will not be considered by the Supreme
Court on the appeal. Undoubtedly this doctrine rests on the
grounds that an appellate court exists primarily for the cor-
rection of lower court errors. If the lower court has not had
the opportunity to decide the question presented, there is no
error for the Supreme Court to correct. Involved also must
be some idea that the appellant has waived his objection to
something which was not objected to below. Regardless of the
rationale, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this settled principle
in the following cases during the 1958-1959 term: Rushton v.
Smith;4' Waltz v. The Equitable Life Assur. Soc.42 ; Elliott
v. Black River Elec. Coop.;43 Rogers v. Florence Printing
39. CODS OF LAWS op SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-1213.
40. 231 S. C. 545, 99 S. E. 2d 391 (1957). See discussion this case at
11 S. C. L. Q. 96 (1958).
41. 233 S. C. 292, 104 S. E. 2d 376 (1958).
42. 233 S. C. 210, 104 S. E. 2d 384 (1958).
43. 23a S. C. 233, 104 S. E. 2d 357 (1958).
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Co.;4 4 Laughlin v. Livingston;45 Lisenby v. Newson;45 G.A.C.
Finance Corp. v. Citizens & Southern Nat. Bank of South
Carolina.
4 7
Laughlin v. Livingston, supra, presents this point in a
slightly unusual way. After losing a trial in a magistrate's
court action for ejectment, the defendant appealed to the
Circuit Court. By correspondence, plaintiff's attorney and the
circuit judge set the date for the hearing. Copies of all letters
were sent to defendant's attorney and he appeared at the trial.
The circuit judge affirmed the magistrate.
Then, apparently for the first time, defendant questioned
the circuit court's jurisdiction because no "return" of the rec-
ord was made from the magistrate's court to the Circuit Court
as required by § 7-306 of the 1952 Code. The Supreme Court
held, however, that defendant's attorney had as much to do
with bringing the appeal to hearing as plaintiff's attorney
and, having participated without objection, could not now
complain about possible irregularities.
Another of these cases, Rogers v. Florence Printing Com-
pany,48 in dicta reminded the bar that when requested instruc-
tions are refused by the trial judge, they must be insisted on
to preserve the exception on appeal. A related case which also
underlines the necessity of adequately preparing the record
in the lower court if an appeal is anticipated is G.A.C. Fi-
nance Corp. v. Citizens & S. Nat. Bk.49 At the conclusion of
the judge's instructions, he must excuse the jury to give the
lawyers an opportunity to object to or make suggestions on
the charge. Section 10-1210.5° If no objection or suggestion is
made, counsel may not later complain of errors or omissions
in the charge to the jury.
Furbeck v. Crest Manufacturing Company,5 1 the plaintiff
sued for breach of a contract of employment and defendants
demurred to the complaint and the demurrer was over-ruled.
The defendants did not appeal from the order over-ruling
the demurrer but after the case had been tried and resulted
44. 233 S. C. 567, 106 S. E. 2d 258 (1958).
45. 233 S.C. 81, 103 S. E. 2d 741 (1958).
46. 234 S. C. 237, 107 S. E. 2d 449 (1959).
47. 234 S. C. 205, 107 S. E. 2d 315 (1959).
48. 233 S. C. 567, 106 S. E. 2d 258 (1958) (Supra Notes 30 & 46).
49. 234 S. 4. 205, 107 S. E. 2d 315 (1959).
50. CODE OF LAWS oF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952, Amendment 1956.
51. 233 S. C. 169, 103 S. E. 2d 920 (1958).
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in a verdict for the plaintiff the defendants contended that
the trial judge erred in construing the earlier order over-
ruling the defendants' demurrer as establishing the law of the
case concerning the nature of the contract. The Supreme
Court held:
There was no appeal from Judge Henderson's Order
(over-ruling the Demurrer) which renders appellants'
position at this time untenable.
The Supreme Court went on to say that it felt that in any
event the trial judge's ruling was correct. The holding of the
Court with reference to this point is somewhat confusing,
since, from the opinion, it appears that the appellants were
not questioning the correctness of the order over-ruling the
demurrer but, rather, were questioning the correctness of the
trial judge's construction of such order. However, counsel
may be well advised to take an appeal from any order over-
ruling a demurrer if this case be followed on this particular
point, otherwise they may take the risk that another judge's
interpretation of this earlier order may be non-appealable.
In Sanders v. Jasper County Board of Education,52 the
plaintiff sued the County for damages for alleged breach of
a contract to transport children to school. On appeal the de-
fendant argued that it was not liable to the plaintiff be-
cause the State Educational Finance Commission, under cer-
tain Code Sections, had taken over school bus operations. The
Supreme Court declined to consider this ground, saying:
... search of the record discloses that this position was
not taken in the answer or at any stage of the trial or
in Motions for Judgment n.o.v., and the new trial, hence
it is unavailable upon Appeal.
In Turbeville v. Gordon, 3 the plaintiff sued to recover a
balance due for construction of a house and for the reasonable
value of the use of property and one of the defendants demur-
red to the complaint. The demurrer was over-ruled and de-
fendant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the order
over-ruling the demurrer and said with reference to one
point:
There is some reference in appellants' brief to the Statute
of Frauds but this question was not presented to the
Court below and cannot be raised here for the first time.
52. 233 S. G. 414, 105 S. E. 2d 201 (1958).
53. 2338. 0. '75, 103 S. E. 2d 521 (1958).
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B. Timely Objection to Juror
In Spencer, as Administratrix v. Kirby,5 4 an auto accident
case, the court below granted the defendant's motion for a
new trial after a verdict for the plaintiff. The ground for the
new trial was that the foreman of the petit jury had been a
member of the grand jury when a "No Bill" was returned
on an indictment charging the defendant with murder for the
death of plaintiff's intestate arising out of the same collision.
The Supreme Court reversed the new trial order and rein-
stated the verdict, adverting to the familiar rule that one will
not be permitted to take his chances on a favorable verdict
and upon disappointment have the verdict set aside on a tech-
nicality. The Court held that Section 38-103 of the 1952 Code,
providing that "No member of the grand jury which has
found an indictment shall be put upon the jury for the trial
thereof," was not applicable in that it has reference only to
the trial of one charged with the commission of a crime, an
obviously correct conclusion.
The Court pointed out that there was no objection inter-
posed to any juror's qualifications prior to the empanelling
or the return of the verdict, nor was there any showing of
lack of negligence in failing to make discovery of the dis-
qualification before the verdict, or that injury had been suf-
fered thereby.
C. Timely Application for Appointment of Guardian-
ad-Litem
In Green v. Boney,55 the summons and complaint were
served on defendant while he was in the custody of the Fair-
field County Sheriff after being sentenced to a term of im-
prisonment on a plea of guilty of involuntary manslaughter.
A month later, through counsel, he filed an answer and coun-
terclaim, and later amended his pleadings. One week prior to
trial he served notice of a motion for a continuance "until
such time as a guardian ad litem is appointed to appear for
him" on the ground that he was confined to the State Peni-
tentiary. This motion was refused on the day of the trial.
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the defendant
had ample opportunity to apply for the appointment of a guar-
dian, and that his able counsel, with full knowledge of the
54. 234 S. C. 59' 106 S. E. 2d 883 (1959).
55. 233 S. C. 49, 103 S. E. 2d 732 (1958).
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Statute,50 waited until the eve of the trial to raise the ques-
tion. The right to the appointment, said the Court, had been
waived.
XVI. WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL
A. Waiver of Policy Provisions
The question of whether an insurer can rely on technical
non-compliance as to filing proof of loss while at the same
time denying liability on grounds not related to proof of loss
was before the court in American Mutual Fire Insurance Com-
pany v. Green.5T On the day after the fire and at the scene
thereof, an adjuster for the company told the insured not to
remove any of the salvage, that he would hear from him soon.
More than two months later the insurer's claims manager de-
nied liability on the ground that the property was unoccupied
at the time of the fire. Not until suit was brought did the
insured find out that the company also took the position that
no written proof of loss within sixty days had been filed. The
lower court held that by denying liability on a ground not re-
lated to proof of loss, i.e., that the property was vacant or
unoccupied, it had waived the proof of loss provision.
The Supreme Court affirmed, stating that the conduct of
the adjuster immediately after the fire was reasonably cal-
culated to lull the insured into inaction and to cause him to
assume that his claim would be considered on the merits with-
out requiring formal proof of loss.
The Court also held that although the question of waiver
or estoppel is normally one of fact for a jury, yet when the
facts are undisputed and warrant only one reasonable infer-
ence, waiver or estoppel becomes a matter of law for the
court.
Brown v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Liability Insur-
ance Company58 involved among other things whether or not
an insurance company had waived its right to require that
the insured give it written notice of an automobile accident
where along with the policy the insurance company had sup-
plied its insured with a card directing that in the case of per-
sonal injuries the accident should be reported by telephone to
the nearest claim office. The Supreme Court held that it was
56. CODM OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 10-232, 237.
57. 233 S. C. 588, 106 S. E. 2d 265 (1958).
58. 233,.S C. 376, 104 S. E. 2d 673 (1958).
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for the jury to decide whether or not the provisions of the
membership card requiring telephone notice be considered a
waiver of the policy's provisions requiring written notice.
The Court then said:
We will now consider the question of whether the re-
spondent had the right to introduce evidence of the
waiver of this provision of the policy when such was not
pleaded in the complaint.
This Court, in numerous cases, has defined waiver as
being the intentional relinquishment of a known right.
In 29 Am. Jur., Insurance, Para. 1422, at page 1065, it
is said: ' . . . Where the complaint in an action on an
insurance policy contains no allegation of waiver of a pro-
vision of the policy, but the affirmative answer tenders
that issue, evidence is properly admissible thereunder in
behalf of the plaintiff as a rebuttal matter to meet a de-
fense attempted to be raised by the defendant. It has also
been held that while the fact of a waiver of a condition as
to proof of loss must be specially pleaded and will not
be admitted in evidence under allegations of performance,
the evidence of waiver of mode or manner of making, or
sufficiency thereof, may be received in proof under gen-
eral allegations of performance of conditions.'
In this case, under the particular facts herein recited,
and the conflicting conditions stated in the policy as to
the giving of notice of the accident or loss, we are of the
opinion that the Circuit Judge was correct in permitting
the respondent to show that the insurer had waived the
provision of the giving of written notice by attaching to
said policy a provision permitting the giving of oral no-
tice, even though the complaint did not allege waiver. ....
We think that under a general allegation of compli-
ance with all the conditions of the contract, the plaintiff
may show waiver under the particular facts in this case.
B. Estoppel by Judgement
In Mackey v. Frazier,59 the owner of a truck driven by his
servant had previously sued a motorist for damages resulting
from an automobile-truck collision and the motorist counter-
claimed against the truck owner for damages allegedly result-
ing from the negligent operation of the truck by the owner's
59. 234 S. . 81, 106 S. E. 2d 895 (1959).
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servant. In that case there was a judgment for the plaintiff.
Thereafter, the motorist, Mackey, brought an independ-
ent action against the truck driver, Frazier. In the instant
case the plaintiff's complaint contained the same allegations
of negligence as he had set up in his earlier counterclaim to
the action by the truck owner. The defendant in this case
moved for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that the
former adjudication was a bar to the action brought by the
present plaintiff. The lower court denied the motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings and the defendant appealed. The Su-
preme Court said:
The sole issue to be determined is whether when one
sues the master for personal injury, caused by the sole
negligence of the servant, and, failing in such action, can
he then bring another action against the servant, alleg-
ing the same acts of negligence as the proximate cause
of his injury and damage? .....
When the respondent in this action filed a counterclaim
in the first action above mentioned, he was in the same
position of a plaintiff bringing an action against the de-
fendant .... The respondent asserted the master's lia-
bility to him by reason of the negligence of the servant
because the servant was acting within the scope of his em-
ployment in the operation of the truck in question. It is
true that a servant who is guilty of a negligent breach of
a duty toward a third person, resulting in injury to him
is liable therefor, whether the principal is or not ....
The Supreme Court went on to hold that the plaintiff in this
case was estopped to maintain the action, saying:
The doctrine of estoppel by judgment proceeds upon
the principle that one person shall not a second time liti-
gate, with the same person or with another so identified
in interest with such person that he represents the same
legal right, precisely the same question, particular con-
troversy, or issue which has been necessarily tried and
finally determined, upon its merits, by a Court of com-
petent jurisdiction, in a judgment in personam in a for-
mal suit ....
The Court distinguished between estoppel by judgment and
res adjudicata, saying:
However, we do not hold that the judgment in favor
of Sloan Williams, who was the master, operates as res
[Vol. 12
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judicata in a subsequent action against his servant or
agent for the reason that the parties are not the same and
there is no such privity between them as is necessary
for the application of that doctrine. In order to make out
a defense of res judicata, the following elements must be
shown: (1) the parties must be the same or their
privies; (2) the subject matter must be the same; and
(3) while generally the precise point must be ruled on,
yet where the parties are the same or are in privity, the
judgment is an absolute bar not only of what was de-
cided but what might have been decided ....
The true ground upon which a formal judgment, in a
case like this, should be allowed to operate as a bar to
a second action, is not res judicata, or technical estoppel,
because the parties are not the same, and there is no
such privity between them as is necessary for the applica-
tion of that doctrine; but that in such cases, on grounds
of public policy, the principle of estoppel should be ex-
panded, so as to embrace within the estoppel of a judg-
ment persons who are not, strictly speaking, either
parties or privvies. It is rested upon the wholesome prin-
ciple which allows every litigant one opportunity to try
his case on the merits, but limits him, in the interest of
the public, to one such opportunity ....
C. Equitable Estoppel
In Fockman v. Clanton's Auto Auction Sales,60 the plaintiff,
an automobile dealer, sued the defendant, an automobile
wholesaler, for breach of contract arising out of the defend-
ant's having stopped payment on two checks given to the
plaintiff as a price for two automobiles sold by the plaintiff
on the defendant's wholesale auction market. The defendant
asserted by way of justification that prior thereto an alleged
agent of the plaintiff dealer had purchased an automobile
from the defendant and had given a worthless check therefor.
The plaintiff recovered a verdict in the lower court and the
defendant appealed. One of the main issues in the case in-
volved the question of whether or not one Barker, who had
previously given the bad check to the defendant, was an agent
of the plaintiff. The Supreme Court held that the defendant
having alleged agency must show that the agent had real or
60. 233 S. C. 591, 106 S. E. 2d 272 (1958).
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apparent authority to act for the plaintiff. Since the plaintiff
denied the agency the defendant was forced to rely upon the
apparent authority of the agent and the principle of equitable
estoppel. Citing authority, the Court said:
Accordingly it is a general rule that, when a principal
by any such acts or conduct has knowingly caused or
permitted another to appear to be his agent, either gen-
erally or for a particular purpose, he will be estopped to
deny such agency to the injury of the third persons who
having good faith and in the exercise of reasonable pru-
dence dealt with the agent on the faith of such appear-
ances ... on the principle that where one of two innocent
persons must suffer loss, the loss will fall on him whose
conduct brought about the situation ....
The general rule, it will be observed, embraces three
primary elements. These are (1) a representation by the
principal, (2) a reliance upon such representation by a
third person; and (3) a change of position by such third
person in reliance upon such representation. All three
elements must be present to bring a case within the rule.
The person sought to be bound must, by his word or con-
duct, have represented that the person assuming to act
for him had authority so to do. Accordingly an estoppel
does not arise from the mere fact that the agent has acted
for the principal on one or more previous occasions, but
not under the appearance of a general authority so to
act, nor does the rule in the question applied to acts of
the agent outside the scope of the authority which the
principal has caused him to seem to possess ....
It is indicated by the cases in South Carolina that one
may not assert estoppel on the theory that he was misled
by circumstances when he knew nothing about those cir-
cumstances ....
The Court then held that because of conflicting evidence as
to whether or not Barker was the plaintiff's agent the ques-
tion was for the jury.
D. Failure to Require Reply to Affirmative Defense
In Brown v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Liability In-
surance Company,61 the plaintiff sued for certain benefits
under an automobile liability insurance policy. The defendant
61. 233 S. C. 376, 104 S. E. 2d 673 (1958).
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pleaded affirmatively in its answer the non-performance by
plaintiff of certain policy conditions. The plaintiff did not
file a reply to the defendant's affirmative defense. The Su-
preme Court said:
The complaint of the respondent has complied with the
requirements ... of the Code. The answer of the appel-
lant, following proper practice, sets up affirmatively, in
its second defense, that there was no liability under the
contract of insurance for the reason that no written no-
tice of the accident or loss was given by the insured. If
the appellant desired a reply to this new matter set forth
in its answer, then it should have made a Motion, pur-
suant to Section 10-61 of the 1952 Code of Laws of South
Carolina. to require the respondent to reply thereto ....
The appellant did not avail itself of this remedy. The
respondent had no right to reply to this defense, and un-
der Section 10-608, the 1952 Code of Laws of South Caro-
lina, this new matter in the answer would deem to be con-
troverted or denied by the respondent.
XVII. RES JUDICATA AND LAW OF THE CASE
In Pharr v. Canal Insurance Company,62 several plaintiffs
brought suit against the defendant insurance company to col-
lect certain judgments which they had secured against one
Bush arising out of an automobile accident. The defendant in-
surance company had previously issued an automobile liability
policy to Bush as insured. When these actions by the injured
parties had originally been brought against Bush the attor-
neys for the plaintiffs had sent direct to the defendant insur-
ance company copies of the pleadings and the insurance com-
pany by its attorneys had secured an indefinite extension of
time in which to answer. Thereafter, because of Bush's fail-
ure to cooperate with the company in any way, the insurer
proceeded in court against Bush and secured a declaratory
judgment that it was not obligated to defend any of the ac-
tions or pay any judgments which might be secured against
Bush because of his violation of the provisions of the policy.
When this judgment was secured the insurer notified the
plaintiffs that it was withdrawing from the cases. The plain-
tiffs then proceeded to secure default judgments against
62. 233 S. C. 266. 104 S. E. 2d 394 (1958).
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Bush, after which the instant suits were instituted directly
against the insurance company. The insurer contended as one
of its defenses that the declaratory judgment exonerated it
from any obligation to Bush and relieved it of any obligation
to these plaintiffs. It further contended that there was no
privity of contract between it and these plaintiffs to permit
them to sue it directly. Finally, it contended that it was in no
event liable to the plaintiffs because of the insured, Bush's,
failure to cooperate with the insurance company in defense of
any of the actions. The lower court over-ruled all contentions
of the defendant insurance company and directed a verdict in
favor of the plaintiffs for judgment against the defendant to
the extent of its policy coverage. Its action was affirmed on
appeal to the Supreme Court. Concerning the asserted bar of
the declaratory judgment the Supreme Court said:
We conclude that the declaratory judgment obtained by
the appellant was not res adjudicata in this case for the
reason that the declaratory judgment act specifically pro-
vides that 'no declaration shall prejudice the rights of
persons not parties to the proceedings.' The identity of
parties necessary to res adjudicata is missing. If the re-
spondents had been parties to the declaratory action pro-
ceeding, they, of course, would have been bound by the
judgment there obtained. Since they were not parties
thereto nor were they in privity with any party thereto,
they are not bound by the judgment there obtained.
With reference to the insurers' contention that there was no
privity of contract between it and the plaintiffs the Supreme
Court said, after quoting certain policy provisions:
It appears from the foregoing provisions of the liability
policy that no action can be brought against the insurer
until the amount of the insured's obligation shall have
been finally determined by a judgment against the in-
sured, and then, that any person securing such judgment
shall be entitled to recover under the policy to the extent
of the insurance afforded thereby. This provision of the
contract is for the benefit of the injured party who can
exercise the right therein given by compliance with the
conditions stated in this paragraph of the contract. This
Court has held in numerous cases that a contract between
two persons for the benefit of a third, even though such
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third party be not named therein, can be enforced by such
third party.
XVIII. APPEALS
A. Review of Facts
There were several cases during the term which re-stated
certain basic principles of trials and review of findings of
facts. Fundamental is the proposition, stated by a federal
court, that when evidence conflicts, the jury is the judge of
the facts, including the credibility of witnesses. 63 Further-
more, when a judge is the trier of fact in a law case, his de-
cision is as unassailable as the finding of a jury.64 Before the
Supreme Court will upset the findings of fact by judge or jury
in a case at law, appellant must show that no reasonable man
would have found the same way that the judge or jury found.
The standard for review in equity cases is different. Under
the Constitution, the Supreme Court may review the findings
of fact.65 However, if two judges concur in findings of fact,
the Court will not set aside the findings unless without evi-
dentiary support or against the clear preponderance of the
evidence.66 It seems to this writer that this statement is con-
fusing. If a finding has no evidentiary support, then a fortiori
it is against the clear preponderance of the evidence. Stating
that the finding will be reversed if against the clear prepon-
derance of the evidence sounds like saying that the Court will
review the evidence de novo. Yet in practice, the Court is very
reluctant to upset findings concurred in by two lower court
judges. This reluctance seems grounded primarily in the fact
that the trial judge, having seen the witnesses, is the best
judge of their credibility.
67
Related to the above cases dealing with standards of re-
view of findings of fact are two other cases. In Williams v.
Ford,68 plaintiff presented only circumstantial evidence, i. e.,
skid marks and position of accident, to prove defendant
63. Meek v. Harris, 256 F. 2d 579 (4th Cir. 1958).
64. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Palmetto Quarries Co., 234 S. C.
246, 107 S. E. 2d 453 (1959), see also Evatt v. Campbell, 234 S. C. 1,
106 S. E. 2d 447 (1959) (dictum).
65. S. C. CONST. art. V, § 4 (1895).
66. Lisenby v. Newsom, 234 S. C. 237, 107 S. E. 2d 449 (1959) ; Evatt
v. Campbell (ibid); Caine v. Griffin, 232 S. C. 562, 103 S. E. 2d 37
(1958).
67. Lisenby v. Newsom, (ibid).
68. 233 S. C. 304, 104 S. E. 2d 378 (1958).
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driver's negligence. Defendant's evidence included three eye-
witnesses whose testimony was consistent with plaintiff's
circumstantial evidence. The jury found for the plaintiff, but
the trial judge granted judgment n.o.v. In affirming, the
Court held that a verdict based on circumstantial evidence
must be such that, "considered in the light of ordinary ex-
perience, (the evidence) would lead with reasonable certainty
to such conclusion and not leave it to mere speculation or con-
jecture."
In American Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Green,69
the trial judge was faced with deciding whether, on certain
undisputed facts, an insurer was estopped to assert failure
to file proof of loss within the required period. The judge
held the insurer to be estopped. The Supreme Court, review-
ing this decision, said that ordinarily waiver or estoppel is for
the jury's determination, but where the facts are undisputed
and warrant only one reasonable inference, it is a matter of
law. It is not clear whether the Court is here merely applying
the usual standard of review on findings of fact or granting
the trial judge greater freedom because the facts are undis-
puted. If the Court is simply applying the usual standard, it
seems irrelevant that the facts are undisputed. If the Court is
applying a different rule because the facts are undisputed, the
greater freedom given the trial judge in one breath is with-
drawn in the next breath by requiring that there be "only
one reasonable inference."
B. Appealability of Motion to Strike
In Blackmon v. United Insurance Co.,70 the beneficiary
of a life insurance policy of a face value of $200.00 sued the
company for $3,000.00 actual and punitive damages. The
Supreme Court agreed with the lower court that the cause
of action set out in the complaint was one for fraudulent
breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act. It held,
therefore, that the motion to strike the allegations appro-
priate to punitive damages was properly refused, and added
that the refusal of such a motion is not appealable.
C. Additional Sustaining Grounds
A full exposition of the provisions of Section 7 of Rule 4
of the State Supreme Court relating to the serving by a re-
69. 283 S. C. 588, 106 S. E. 2d 265 (1958).
70. 233 S. G. 424, 105 S. E. 2d 521 (1958).
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spondent of additional sustaining grounds is contained in the
opinion of Mr. Justice Legge, speaking for a unanimous Court,
in Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. S. C. Tax Commission.7 1
In an action to recover taxes paid under protest the plaintiff
domestic insurance company challenged the act imposing the
tax on three grounds. The court below agreed with it on the
first ground, rejected the other two grounds, and decreed the
relief prayed for. The Tax Commission appealed and, when it
served the proposed case on respondent, the latter proposed
the two rejected grounds as "additional sustaining grounds."
The appellant rejected these amendments, the matter went to
trial court for settlement, and that court excluded the addi-
tional sustaining grounds as "an attempt by plaintiff-respond-
ent to raise questions on appeal which were presented in the
court below and specifically ruled upon adverse to the plain-
tiff-respondent. No objection was made to these rulings ...
no appeal taken therefrom, and time therefor has long since
expired." The respondent served notice of appeal from this
order, printed as an appendix to its brief the additional
grounds, the order settling the case, and its exceptions to that
order, and served notice on the appellant that it would apply
to the Supreme Court on the day of oral argument for leave
to file the appendix to its brief as "an appendix to the case
for appeal as settled."
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court on this point,
pointing out that the purpose of the additional sustaining
grounds provision of Rule 4, Section 7 was to relieve a re-
spondent who has obtained the relief sought in the trial court,
from the necessity of appealing from adverse rulings that did
not affect the result reached below. To be entitled to consider-
ation as an "additional ground" two factors must be present:
it must relate to a matter that was presented to the trial court,
and it must be such that its acceptance would lead to the same
result that the trial court reached. The Court pointed out that
although the rule refers to these as "amendments" to the pro-
posed case, they are in fact "addenda." To require respondent
here to appeal from the adverse rulings as to two of its
grounds, when the favorable ruling on its other ground gave
all the relief sought, would defeat the very purpose of the rule.
In passing, the Court noted that although a respondent
might be restricted in argument to those additional sustaining
71. 233 S. C. 129, 103 S. E. 2d 908 (1958).
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grounds of which it had given notice under the rule, the Su-
preme Court has the power under Section 8 of the same rule
to affirm upon any grounds appearing in the record. It also
pointed out that the respondent here should have printed the
additional grounds and the order settling the appeal as an ap-
pendix to the case as settled and not as an appendix to its
brief. However, the Court proceeded to consider the additional
grounds on their merits.
D. Abandonment of Exception
In G. F. Sanders v. Jasper County Board of Education,72
the Supreme Court said:
Substituted counsel have presented the appeal upon
printed brief, without oral argument. It is said in it with
respect to the exception taken by the predecessor counsel,
'it will therefore be seen that an examination of the testi-
mony and exhibits will be necessary in the light of the ex-
ceptions in the consideration of the appeal, and we there-
fore respectfully submit the same to the Court.' This is
not argument of the exceptions as they must be deemed to
have been abandoned. (Emphasis ours.)
72. 233 S. C. 414,105 S. E. 2d 201 (1958).
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